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COMMENT
THE RIGHTS OF PRISONERS WHILE INCARCERATED
INTRODUCTION
A defendant has been convicted, sentenced, and the conviction has been
confirmed on appeal by the highest court of the state. Does an attorney's duty
to his client end here? If the purpose of confinement in a prison is truly
rehabilitation and return to a beneficial role in society, those rights remaining
to a prisoner should be jealously safeguarded. A working knowledge of the
legal status of an inmate in a state institution is indispensable to the attorney
in whose hands the life and fortune of his client have been placed. Therefore,
if possible, explanation of a client's rights to him at the time of incarcera-
tion would be most salutory. Imprisonment will breed further contempt for
the system unless the inmate understands that he is still human and as such,
still has enforceable rights and can successfully overcome abuses of over-zealous
or over-cautious prison officials.
In a legal system which has in the past few years come to recognize the
importance of the rights of individuals,' where it is felt better to let the guilty
go free rather than to imprison one innocent man, it would be gross hypocrisy
to allow this shield of individual rights to be cast aside simply because a
man has become an inmate in a penal institution. It is in the prison situation,
where abuse can so easily be concealed from the public eye, that the attorney
must be ever vigilant, protecting the civil and human rights of his client.
Utilization of a lawyer's skills in pointing out deficiencies to prison administra-
tors will not only improve the inmate's lot, but also make the administrator
aware of injustices which may have escaped his attention.
The purpose of this treatment is to familiarize attorneys and prison
administrators with some of the current problems in an area which has re-
ceived little attention but is nevertheless critically important to those affected.
Hopefully, this discussion will furnish a starting point for those concerned
with the rights of the imprisoned and provide a basis for more extensive
analysis. Emphasis will be given to an examination of the civil death provi-
sions of the New York Penal Law and their effect on a prisoner's right to
sue, contract, convey realty, inherit, execute a will, hold public office, vote,
and continue his marital status. His rights as an inmate are also explored:
mail privileges; access to courts, attorneys, and legal materials; and his
freedom of speech and religion. These topics are examined with an eye to the
presentation of each problem area rather than an exhaustive study of any one
particular area.
1. E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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THE EFFECT OF CIVIL DEATH OR SUSPENSION OF CIVIL RIGHTS
A. Generally2
It has been said that "[a] prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary
citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him
by law."3 The doctrine of civil death (known at common law as civiliter
mortuus) denies a person convicted of certain degrees of crime the civil rights
which all citizens enjoy. Sections 510 and 511 of the New York Penal Law
are the current embodiment of this penal sanction. Whether expressed in
terms of "shall be deemed civilly dead" 4 or "all civil rights shall be sus-
pended," 5 the effect is the same: the person upon whom these words are pro-
nounced is less than a full citizen. The only distinction between a person
civilly dead and one whose civil rights have been suspended is the length of
the term to which he has been sentenced.
New York's civil death statute passed by the legislature in 1799 was
the first such enactment in the United States.6 It was said to have been declara-
tory of the common law,7 but "the strict civil death seems to have been con-
fined to the cases of persons professed (entering religious orders), or abjured,
or banished the realm . ,,*"8 Though the common law of civil death was so
clarified in the case of Platner v. Sherwood,9 later judicial interpretation ex-
panded the doctrine far beyond its original concept.
In the application of the present civil death statutes,10 the courts have
2. See 37 Va. L. Rev. 105 (1951) for a good discussion of New York law before 1948.
See also 34 Va. L. Rev. 463 (1948). See generally 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law §§ 616-29
(1965); 16 Am. Jur. Death §§ 2-11 (1938).
3. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945).
4. N.Y. Pen. Law § 511 (semble).
5. N.Y. Pen. Law § 510 (semble).
6. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1799, Ch. 57.
7. Troup v. Wood, 4 Johns Ch. R. 228 (N.Y. 1820).
8. Platner v. Sherwood, 6 Johns Ch. R. 118, 128, 2 N.Y. Chan. Rep. 73 (1822).
9. Ibid.
10. N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 510-11:
§ 510. Forfeiture of office and suspension of civil rights.-A sentence of imprison-
ment in a state prison for any term less than for life or a sentence of imprisonment
in a state prison for an indeterminate term, having a minimum of one day and a
maximum of natural life, forfeits all the public offices, and suspends, during the
term of the sentence, all the civil rights, and all private trusts, authority, or powers
of, or held by, the person sentenced; but nothing herein contained shall be deemed
to suspend the right or capacity of any of the following persons to institute an
action or proceeding in a court or before a body or officer exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or administrative functions, with respect to matters other than those aris-
ing out of his arrest or detention:
a. A person sentenced to state prison for any term less than for life or a
person sentenced to imprisonment in a state prison for an indeterminate term, hav-
ing a minimum of one day and a maximum of his natural life, on whom sentence
was imposed and the execution of the judgment suspended, while the execution of
the judgment remains suspended:
b. A person sentenced to state prison for any term less than for life or a
person sentenced to imprisonment in a state prison for an indeterminate term,
having a minimum of one day and a maximum of his natural life, while he is
released on parole, or after he has been discharged from parole.
§ 511. Consequences of sentence to imprisonment for life-A person sentenced to
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been burdened with prior judicial interpretations. They founder while attempt-
ing to breathe life into this anachronistic doctrine. "Civil Death seems today
a somewhat impractical and doubtful penalty. It is hard to apply and often
inflicts a greater injury upon the innocent family or relatives of the felon
or even upon the state itself . . . than it does upon the convict."" It has been
said that the prime concern of the New York civil death statute is for the
spouse and children of the convict; 12 but in actuality, its effect is to hinder
more than aid these objects of its bounty.
A curious inconsistency noted by this writer is the apparent neglect by
the authors of modern civil death statutes to cover the very situation which
the common law had in mind when the doctrine of civil death was originated,
namely, the status of a person sentenced to death. Since a person sentenced
to life or less is not civilly dead unless there are statutory provisions providing
so,13 it is not inconceivable that this rationale should also apply to one sentenced
to death. Therefore, it is at least arguable that a person sentenced to death
may enjoy all his civil rights unfettered since there is no express statutory
provision to the contrary. Specific references below, concerning the rights
of prisoners, will further point out the inconsistencies and confusions possible
when a common law doctrine outlives its usefulness.
B. Civil Death and the Felon's Right to Court Process
1. As a Plaintiff
Can a felon bring civil suit while in prison? The New York Civil Rights
Law' 4 implies that court process is a civil right and as such is unavailable to
a convicted felon sentenced to a state institution.15 It has been held that a
imprisonment for life is thereafter deemed civilly dead; provided, that such a
person may marry while on parole, or after he has been discharged from parole,
if otherwise capable of contracting a valid marriage. Such capability shall be deemed
to exist where the marriage of a person sentenced to imprisonment for life has
been terminated by divorce, annulment, or subsequent remarriage of a former
spouse. A marriage contracted pursuant to this section by a person while he is on
parole, without the prior written approval of the board of parole, shall be a ground
for revocation of the parole.
2. This section shall not apply to a person sentenced to imprisonment for an
indeterminate term, having a minimum of one day and a maximum of his natural
life.
3. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to suspend the right or capacity of
a person sentenced to imprisonment for life, while he is released on parole, or
after he has been discharged from parole, to institute an action or proceeding
in a court or before a body or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or adminis-
trative functions, with respect to matters other than those arising out of his arrest
and detention.
4. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude the issuance of a
certificate of good conduct by the board of parole pursuant to the executive law to
a person who previously had been sentenced to imprisonment for life.
11. 5 Calif. L. Rev. 81, 83 (1916). See generally Annot., 139 A.L.R. 1308 (1942).
12. Garner v. Shulte Co., 23 A.D.2d 127, 259 N.Y.S.2d 161 (3d Dep't 1965).
13. Note, 17 L.RA. (N.S.) 502 (1909).
14. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 10.
15. N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 510-11.
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statutory exception to the right to sue must be distinctly expressed. 1' New
York's statute has passed this test and has been found to be constitutional,
not violative of either article 1, section 1 of the United States Constitution
or the fourteenth amendment.1T Thus the right of a state to suspend the right
to sue during the term of sentence has been fully acknowledged. 18 In con-
trast, since no federal statute has adopted the doctrine of civil death, federal
courts have implied that inmates in federal prisons may file either federal
suits or suits in state jurisdictions where statutes of limitation may run because
of their confinement.
19
New York, prior to the 1946 and 1952 revisions of the Penal Law sections
relating to civil death, subscribed to the majority American rule that, gen-
erally, convicts enjoy no right to sue.20 However, to alleviate much suffering
by the families of convicts, New York employed a device which conferred
jurisdiction on the courts by passing special enabling acts,21 in the form of
private bills. Claims were thus reduced to resultant money awards which were
turned over to the families of convicts. But the majority of prisoners' families
enjoyed no special consideration by the legislature and this stop-gap remedy
was far from sufficient.
22
The requirement that a claimant against the state file a notice of claim
within a specified period after the claim accrues also played havoc with in-
carcerated prisoners. It had been held that the fact that one is under disability
due to the civil death statutes did not obviate the necessity for filing a
notice of claim. 23 This claim must be filed in every action under the Court
of Claims Act, section ten. A distinction is drawn between the filing of a claim,
which right is suspended during confinement (under Court of Claims Act, section
ten, subdivision -five, the prisoner has two years to pursue the claim after
disability is removed), and the notice of intention to file a claim, not a civil
right, therefore, mandatory upon penalty of dismissal. This distinction, based
upon capacity due to suspension or loss of civil rights is a most dubious one.
16. Saxe v. Peck, 139 App. Div. 419, 124 N.Y. Supp. 14 (3d Dep't 1910).
17. Harrell v. State, 17 Misc. 2d 950, 188 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Ct. CI. 1959).
18. E.g., Burns v. City of New York, 21 A.D.2d 767, 250 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1st Dep't 1964).
19. Tabor v. Hardwick, 224 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 890
(1955). (Dismissal of prisoner's civil suit was proper where both the state in which the
prisoner desired to bring suit and the state where he was incarcerated both provided for
tolling of the statute of limitations.)
20. See 18 C.J.S. Convicts § 7 (1939).
21. See, e.g., N.Y. Sess. Laws 1933, ch. 382, conferring jurisdiction for trial of
Tomaselli v. State, 168 Misc. 674, 6 N.Y.S.2d 435 (Ct. Cl. 1938); N.Y. Sess. Laws 1933,
ch. 547, conferring jurisdiction for trial of Cullen v. State, 247 App. Div. 921, 287 N.Y.
Supp. 677 (3d Dep't 1936), aff'd mem., 277 N.Y. 541, 13 N.E.2d 465 (1938); N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1935, ch. 961, conferring jurisdiction for trial of Bhullar v. State, 248 App. Div. 802,
289 N.Y. Supp. 41 (3d Dep't 1936).
22. See Green v. State, 278 N.Y. 15, 14 N.E.2d 833 (1938) (no capacity to sue with-
out jurisdiction being granted by statute while under disability of suspension or loss of
civil rights).
23. Pascucci v. County of Nassau, 8 Misc. 2d 229, 165 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sup. Ct. 1957);
Federman v. State, 173 Misc. 830, 19 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Ct. Cl. 1940); Baronness v. State, 153
Misc. 212, 274 N.Y. Supp. 522 (Ct. Cl. 1934).
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Why should a party be any less capable of filing a claim than a notice of
claim? But even under pre-1946 New York law, a vested claim, i.e., a claim
upon which liability has attached prior to incarceration, was held immune
from dismissal where the claimant was subsequently imprisoned.24 The courts
felt that to dismiss such a claim would cause the fact of the sentence to operate
as a forfeiture, a result contrary to public policy as pronounced in statute2 5
However, where a life prisoner petitioned to have outstanding indictments
brought to trial or dismissed for failure to prosecute, the court held that the
statute declaring his civil death meant that he could perform no legal function
and consequently had no standing to compel the prosecution of the indict-
ments.20 But where an assignment of property, while under disability, was
made for the benefit of the victims of the inmate's crime (a sort of restitution),
the court reasoned that since the felon retained no beneficial interest in the
assigned property, and the fact that the purpose of the assignment was to
give their own property back to the victims, in an action brought by the as-
signee to recover such property, the assignee was held to be able to recover the
property 2 7 Here the dictates of logic and the theory of civil death were
sacrificed in the interest of justice. Civil death, it must be remembered, was
at common law applied only to prisoners convicted of felony punishable by
death.
28
Palpable anomaly inevitably results from attempting to attribute
civil death, not only to persons about to be executed, but, also, to
persons who may remain physically alive for many years and also
may be paroled or pardoned. Still greater anomaly results from at-
tempting to transplant the fiction of civil death to a land which has
neither attainder, forfeiture, nor corruption of blood.
2 9
An ostensible saving grace for the doctrine of civil death in New York
is the fact that the statute of limitations is tolled during the period of disabil-
ity.30 The force of this assertion is severely limited when the fact is realized
that release from imprisonment may never occur. 31 Also the statute of limita-
tions requires that the action be brought within the ten year maximum
24. Nastasi v. State, 186 Misc. 1051, 61 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Ct. Cl. 1946).
25. See N.Y. Pen. Law § 512.
26. Quinn v. Johnson, 78 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
27. Bamman v. Erickson, 259 App. Div. 1040, 21 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2d Dep't 1940) (Memo-
randum decision).
28. Shapiro v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the United States, 182 Misc. 678, 45
N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd mem., 268 App. Div. 854, 50 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1st Dep't
1944), aff'd mem., 294 N.Y. 743, 61 N.E.2d 745 (1945).
29. Id. at 681, 45 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
30. Benson v. State, 183 Misc. 972, 52 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Ct. Cl. 1944).
31. Lipschultz v. State, 192 Misc. 70, 78 N.Y.S.2d 731 (Ct. Cl. 1948). In this case,
brought in 1948, the prisoner had a claim against the state for injuries sustained in Clinton
prison. His minimum term was due to expire in the year 1993. He was a man in his fifties.
The court noted: "The order of dismissal herein is granted without prejudice, however, to
the proper prosecution by claimant of his claim against the State after his present sentence
has been duly terminated." 192 Misc. at 71, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 733. One feels the only termina-
tion in this case would be that of claimant's life.
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time allowed. 32 But under the Correction Law,33 a committee can 'be appointed
to administer the inmate's affairs, presumably including the prosecution of
such claims. And if the committee can sue in the prisoner's stead, of what
necessity, and of what force is the doctrine of civil death? It seems to be a
dead letter in this connection.
Prior to the revisions of 1946 and 1952, prisoners on parole had no
capacity to sue.34 In 1946, persons sentenced for periods less than life were
granted the right to sue while on parole or during periods when their sentence
was in suspension.3 5 In 1952, this privilege was extended to prisoners sentenced
to life, while on parole.
36
The statutes require that in order to be deprived of civil rights, the inmate
must be serving his sentence in a "state prison." County Penitentiaries37 and
the Elmira Reception Center38 are not "state prisons" within the statutory
meaning. New York citizens found guilty of federal crimes which would be
felonies in New York do not lose their right to sue because the statutes
relate only to imprisonment in a "state prison." 39 But New York has also held
that a citizen of New York is civilly dead where imprisoned for life in a
foreign state.40 A foreign citizen imprisoned for life in a foreign state which
has no civil death disabilities is nevertheless under disability from suing in
New York.41 Thus New York's interpretation of the doctrine of civil death
has extraterritorial effect.
In a recent case, a parolee instituted a civil suit against the state, and
was later adjudged a parole violator. He was then committed to serve out his
original sentence. He desired to hold an examination before the trial of this
civil suit but it was held that since he was now a felon serving a sentence
in a state prison, his civil rights were again suspended, and he had no right
to use court process to compel the examination. 42 Of course, this suit would
32. See N.Y.CPLR § 208.
33. N.Y. Correction Law, §§ 320-25, 350-61.
34. See, e.g., Hayes v. State, 50 N.Y.S.2d 492 (Ct. Cl. 1944); accord, Lehrman v. State,
176 Misc. 1022, 29 N.Y.S.2d 635 (Ct. Cl. 1941).
35. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1946, ch. 260. For general background see Law Revision Comm.,
1946 Report, Recommendations & Studies 159 (1946 Leg. Doc. No. 65 (F)).
36. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1952, ch. 167. For general background see Law Revision Comm.,
1952 Report, Recommendations & Studies 533 (1952 Leg. Doc. No. 65 (Q)). See also Law
Revision Comm., 1953 Report, Recommendations & Studies 495 (1953 Leg. Doc. No.
65(M)).
37. 1930 Ops. Att'y Gen., 1933 Report of Att'y Gen. 571. (By implication.)
38. Foster v. State, 205 Misc. 736, 129 N.Y.S.2d 418 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
39. Accord, Hill v. Gentry, 280 F.2d 88 (8th Cir. 1960) (per curiam), cert, denied, 364
U.S. 875 (1960) (applying Missouri law). Jones v. Jones, 188 Mo. App. 220, 175 S.W. 227
(1915).
40. Pallas v. Misericordia Hosp., 264 App. Div. 1, 34 N.Y.S.2d 881 (3d Dep't 1942),
aff'd mem., 291 N.Y. 692, 52 N.E.2d 590 (1943).
41. Urbano v. News Syndicate Co., 232 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (applying
Erie doctrine). But see Panko v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 24 F. Supp. 678 (N.D.N.Y. 1938).
See also Vedin v. McConnell, 22 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1927) (cannot declare out of state
resident civilly dead in his own state).
42. Glena v. State, 207 Misc. 776, 138 N.Y.S.2d 857 (Ct. CI. 1955).
43. N.Y.CPLR § 208 provides for the tolling of the statute of limitations for a
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be placed in abeyance, 43 but again the problem of staleness of evidence is
present. Prior to the revisions of 1946 and 1952, a parolee was held to be in
legal custody even while at large. The fact of his release from imprisonment
did not restore his suspended civil rights.44 The rationale of such holdings was
that the parolee was still under sentence and as such was required to finish that
sentence before his civil rights could be restored. Conversely, where a prisoner's
sentence was commuted, his sentence was at an end; therefore, his civil rights
were restored.45 It was also held that the statutes of limitation, where a
prisoner is one whose sentence has been commuted, run from the date of
his release and is not tolled because of any subsequent imprisonment. 46 This
distinction obtains today. Also by legislative amendment,47 a parolee now
enjoys the right to sue whether on parole or after being discharged from parole.43
The statutory language ". . . with respect to matters other than those
arising out of his arrest or detention . . . ,,49 at first blush, presents a problem
where an inmate seeks to recover for an injury received while an inmate of
a state institution. But it was held that this language ". . . should not be
construed to apply to all causes which may arise during detention." 50 It was
felt that this limitation would apply only to cases of false arrest, false imprison-
ment or malicious prosecution.51 Under this rationale, courts have found
it easy to afford relief to inmates who suffered injuries while in prison and
who are presently on parole. In a recent case, a life convict who had been re-
ceiving workmen's compensation benefits prior to incarceration was held not
able to continue receiving these benefits; but the court read section fifteefil
of the Workmen's Compensation Law and section 511 of the Penal Law to-
gether and held that the prisoner's dependents would receive such payments
period of up to ten years after the cause of action accrues where a prisoner is serving a
term less than life imprisonment. Under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 17(b), the capacity for suit
of a prisoner is determined by the law of the state where the federal district court is sitting.
44. White v. State, 166 Misc. 481, 2 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Ct. Cl. 1938), aff'd, 260 App. Div.
413, 23 N.Y.S.2d 526 (3d Dep't 1940), aff'd mem., 285 N.Y. 728, 34 N.E.2d 896 (1941).
45. Gershinsky v. State, 6 A.D.2d 964, 176 N.Y.S.2d 667 (3d Dep't 1958), aff'd mem.,
6 N.Y.2d 798, 159 N.E.2d 681, 188 N.Y.S.2d 190 (1959). Accord, White v. State, 166 Misc.
481, 2 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Ct. Cl. 1938), aff'd, 260 App. Div. 413, 23 N.Y.S.2d 526 (3d Dep't
1940), aff'd mem., 285 N.Y. 728, 34 N.E.2d 896 (1941).
46. Gershinsky v. State, supra note 45.
47. N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 510-11.
48. See Hight v. State, 35 Misc. 2d 926, 231 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Ct. Cl. 1962). Accord,
Melton v. State, 198 Misc. 654, 99 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Ct. Cl. 1950), appeal dismissed, 108
N.Y.S.2d 967 (1951); Duffy v. State, 197 Misc. 569, 94 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Ct. Cl. 1950). See
also Morris v. State, 6 A.D.2d 984, 176 N.Y.S.2d 674 (3d Dep't 1958), where an inmate
had been injured while in prison in the year 1936. He was released on parole in 1940,
consulted an attorney who advised him that under the then current state of the law he
must wait until his sentence was completed before he could present his claim. Subsequently,
he made a timely application for relief after his sentence was completed but the 1946 amend-
ment, conferring upon him the right to sue while on parole had taken effect, and it was
held that his application was therefore not timely since under the amendment it should
have been brought while on parole. His claim was denied. The attorney's advice was correct
at the time but the 1946 amendment to § 510, in effect, cut short this prisoner's right to sue.
49. N.Y. Pen. Law § 510.
So. Grant v. State, 192 Misc. 45, 47, 77 N.Y.S.2d 756, 758 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
51. Ibid.
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as if he were actually dead.52 The court reiterated the policy of the civil
death statute, saying that its purpose is to protect the innocent spouse and
family of the felon. This case is representative of the current trend of the courts
in dealing with the civil death statutes and severely undercuts its original theory
and the practice under which it previously operated. To say that a felon im-
prisoned has no right to sue and yet allow a claim to be prosecuted, in effect,
in his name by his dependents, is to destroy any force which the statute might
have. In this way, mere substitution of parties would have the effect of lifting
the disability imposed by the statute. It would be better to rid the law of such
an anomaly and confer the right to sue upon all prisoners whether serving
sentences, on parole, with sentences commuted, suspended or otherwise. The
spirit of the ancient common law idea of civiliter mortuus would best be con-
fined to the relatively unimportant area of the law which defines the conse-
quences of a judgment of outlawry.
5 3
2. As a Defendant or Necessary Party
Concomitant with the right to sue is the duty to respond as a defendant
in an action, and ".. . the liability to be sued, of necessity implies the right
to defend. . . .14 It has been held that even though a prisoner's civil rights have
been suspended, he must be allowed to employ an attorney when sued or
the right to defend would be illusory,55 the rationale of these holdings being that
liability can attach only where a party is able to defend.50 Also, "... con-
victs should not be allowed to employ their crimes as a shield against the just
demands of creditors . . . . 7 It has even been intimated that a convict may
be subject to involuntary bankruptcy. Thus, in a case where a felon was a
creditor of an estate, in an accounting proceeding held by the executor, the
claim of this creditor-felon which had been rejected by the executor, was
held to be enforceable.50 The court felt that ". . . unless the convict can be
heard now, he can never be heard ..... -6 The creditor-felon, whose civil rights
had been suspended, was not required to proceed by a trustee. It has also been
held that since a felon is subject to the claims of his creditors, he must be
afforded the right to defend such claims.6 In addition, civil death has not
52. Garner v. Shulte Co., 23 A.D.2d 127, 259 N.Y.S.2d 161 (3d Dep't 1965).
53. See N.Y. Code of Crim. Proc. §§ 814-26. A judgment of outlawry is rendered
where a person has escaped custody after a plea or verdict of guilty has been entered on an
indictment for treason. Its effect is civil death in the real sense: forfeiture of realty and
personalty to the people of the State.
54. Werckman v. Werckman, 4 N.Y. Civ. Proc. R. 146, 147 (Oneida County Ct. 1883).
55. Matter of McNally, 144 Cal. App. 2d 531, 301 P.2d 385 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
56. Bonnell v. Rome, W. & 0. R.R., 12 Hun. 218, 19 (N.Y.App. Div., 4th Dep't 1877).
57. Matter of Gainfort, 14 F. Supp. 788, 790 (N.D. Cal. 1936).
58. Ibid.
59. Matter of Weber, 165 Misc. 815, 1 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Surr. Ct. 1938), 26 Geo. L.J.
1051 (1938).
60. Matter of Weber, supra at 817, 1 N.Y.S.2d at 811.
61. Davis v. Duffle, 21 N.Y. Super. Ct. 617, 8 Bosw. 617 (1861), aff'd, 4 Abb. Pr.
(N.S.) 478, 3 Keyes 606 (N.Y. 1867).
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been held a reason to dismiss a garnishment brought against property of the
felon.
02
In another case where an action had begun and issue joined prior to the
plaintiff's conviction of a felony, a motion by the defendant to dismiss for lack
of prosecution was denied. The court realized that a decision allowing dismissal,
as it would have been on the merits, would work a forfeiture of the plaintiff's
rights and felt this result would be contrary to the legislative purpose of the
civil death statute6 3 Plaintiff was allowed to notice the action for trial.
In Bowles v. Haberman where a plaintiff in a civil action had been awarded
damages and was subsequently convicted of a felony and sentenced to prison and
the defendant in this action appealed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff-
felon, it was held that the plaintiff must be allowed to defend the appeal,64 on
the same rationale that obtains where the felon is a defendant in an action.
In a recent case relying on this decision, a remainderman of an express trust
was held to be under no disability in an accounting proceeding brought by the
trustee.6 5 Thus it seems that the disabilities of civil death or suspension of
civil rights are somewhat relaxed where the plaintiff-felon can be characterized
as a defendant in an action whether it be an actual defendant, an appellee or
a necessary party. It would seem that if the legislature were truly interested
in the care of the felon's spouse and family it would allow the same degree of
access to the courts to a felon when he is plaintiff as well as defendant. Surely
one always liable as defendant is no better off than one only allowed limited
court process as plaintiff.
C. The Right to Contract, Convey, Devise, Inherit, and the
Competency of a Prisoner as a Witness
It cannot be denied that a felon whose civil rights have been suspended or
revoked is able to contract for legal assistance in trying to effect his release,
yet an early New York case implied that such a felon could not enforce this
contract. 0 There are no recent cases decided upon such facts but it is presumed
that an attorney-creditor could take advantage of the provisions of the Correc-
tion Law6 7 which allow the creditor of a prisoner to apply for the appointment
of a committee to administer the prisoner's affairs. He would, of course, then
present his claim to that committee.68 A leading case in the right to contract
62. Wise v. Hull, 32 Mo. 209 (1862).
63. Finkelstein v. Badman, 95 N.Y.L.J. 1614 (1936) (N.Y. City Ct.).
64. Bowles v. Habermann, 95 N.Y. 246 (1884). This case is cited throughout the
literature for this proposition but it seems that the actual basis for the decision was that
the felon was not imprisoned in a "state prison" as set out in the statute, but was an
inmate of Kings County Penitentiary. Nevertheless, this dictum has been widely quoted as
the holding of the case.
65. Matter of Brown, 19 A.).2d 24, 240 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1st Dep't 1963).
66. Stephani v. Lent, 30 Misc. 346, 349, 63 N.Y. Supp. 471, 473 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
67. N.Y. Correction Law §§ 320-25, 350-61.
68. An interesting case appeared recently in California where it was held that a parolee
under disability could not be held for the purchase price of an automobile which she had
contracted to buy after her release from prison. It was held that she had no capacity to
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area held that where a prisoner gave a note and mortgage to an attorney as
payment for efforts to secure his parole and then sought to use his disability
as a defense to an action brought to enforce the obligations, the disability would
not apply.6 9 This Oklahoma court, in dealing with their civil death statute
which is in effect the same as New York's, explained that the common law situ-
ations where civil death came into play are gone since attainder is expressly
forbidden in the federal constitution, whether by federal70 or state7' law,
and forfeitures to the state are abolished. The primary import of the doctrine
was embodied by this court in the following pronouncement:
... the principles of law which this verbiage [civiliter inortims]
literally imports had its origin in the fogs and fictions of feudal juris-
prudence and doubtlessly has been brought forward into modern
statutes without fully realizing either the effect of its literal significance
or the extent of its infringement upon the spirit of our system of gov-
ernment.
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In sum, it would seem that, similar to an infant, a prisoner has a right to con-
tract for necessaries. Especially where employment can be a condition for
parole, a prisoner should be able to validly contract for such employment
which will qualify him for release.
At common law a conveyance by an attainted felon bound all except the
king and any party holding under the king.73 So too, a felon's will was valid
except as to the crown.7 4 New York's early finding, still valid, was that a prisoner
for life under disability could transfer by will or deed and could also receive
a devise.75 This holding, by implication, extends these rights to one sentenced to
a period less than life. "[T]he law would not be consistent with itself if it held
the party alive for the purpose of being sued and charged in execution, and yet
dead for the purpose of transmitting his estate to his heirs."7 6
contract, therefore there was no contract upon which to base the action. Not only was
this person incapacitated because of the suspension of her civil rights, but she was also
a minor, the court finding that this was not a case involving necessaries. Rosman v. Cuevas,
176 Cal. App. 2d 867, 1 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1959).
69. Byers v. Sun Sav. Bank, 41 Okla. 728, 139 Pac. 948, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 320, Ann.
Cas. 1916D 222 (1914).
70. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9.
71. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10.
72. Byers v. Sun Say. Bank, 41 Okla. at 731, 139 Pac. at 949, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) at 323.
73. 16 Am. Jur. Deeds § 86 (1938).
74. 57 Am. Jur. Wills § 57 (1948).
75. LaChapelle v. Burpee, 69 Hun. 436, 23 N.Y. Supp. 453 (Sup. Ct., 3d Dep't 1893).
76. Avery v. Everett, 110 N.Y. 317, 18 N.E. 148, 1 L.R.A. 264, 6 Am. St. Rep. 368
(1888), citing Chancellor Kent in Platner v. Sherwood, 6 Johns. Ch. 118 (1922). At com-
mon law, one of the effects of profession as a monk or nun was to cause the person's
will to become effective as if they had died. Law Revision Comm., 1946 Report, Recom-
mendations & Studies 168 (1946 Leg. Doc. No. 65 (F) at 10). An early New York case
decided that this aspect of civil death would not obtain where it was held that letters of
administration could not be granted upon the revocation of rights by the attachment of
the penalty of civil death. Natural death was deemed to be necessary before such result
could occur. Matter of Zeph, 50 Hun. 523, 3 N.Y. Supp. 460 (Sup. Ct. 1888), citing Avery
v. Everett, supra.
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It is also well settled that convicts under disability may inherit.77 These hold-
ings further illustrate the fallacy of regarding civil death as an end to one's
rights.
The common law holdings were to the effect that a felon convicted and
deprived of his civil rights was incompetent as a witness. This was based on
the idea that since his civil rights had been suspended and reputation forfeit,
no credence could be given his statements. Under present law, a person who
has been convicted of a crime is competent to give testimony in any case.
78
The fact of his imprisonment or loss of civil rights goes only to the weight to
be assigned his evidence. This is more in keeping with the present day
attitudes on testimonial capacity.
D. The Right to Hold Public Offices and Private Trusts
The statute79 specifically declares that all public offices and private trusts
are suspended during the term of an inmate's imprisonment.80 The Surrogate's
Court Act 8l provides that a felon cannot serve as a guardian, executor, admin-
istrator, or testamentary trustee; but it was held in a case where, through
some mischance, the husband-administrator of his wife's estate was a felon on
parole, that the appointment could not be attacked collaterally.8 2 In another
case, where a person was convicted in a foreign state of a misdemeanor which
would be a felony if committed in New York, the court refused to allow him to
receive letters testamentary.8 3 These rulings are certainly practical since a
felon imprisoned is virtually denied access to the courts and an appointment as
administrator, for example, would of necessity require free and complete
access.
8 4
In the case of public offices, it was held in a suit brought to compel the
nominating petitions of a person convicted of a federal crime, sentenced to
77. HiU v. Guaranty Trust Co., 163 App. Div. 374, 13 Mills 231, 148 N.Y. Supp. 601
(1st Dep't 1914); Matter of Shaffer, 184 Misc. 855, 56 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Surr. Ct. 1945).
78. N.Y.CPLR § 4513; N.Y. Pen. Law § 2444.
79. N.Y. Pen. Law § 510.
80. It is to be noted that the categories mentioned, public offices and private trusts,
are enumerated specifically, not included in the term "civil rights." See also the following
statutes for the penalties involved where the holder of a license is convicted of a crime:










Gen. Bus. Law § 74 (Private Detectives)
Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 126 (Traffic in Alcoholic Beverages).
81. Surrogate's Ct. Act § 94(4).
82. Levay v. Mate, 194 Misc. 179, 88 N.Y.S.2d 481 (N.Y. City Ct. 1949).
83. Matter of Johnson, 202 Misc. 751, 112 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Surr. Ct. 1952).
84. Query as to misdemeanants as trustees? As a practical matter, how could this
class of persons administer an estate while imprisoned any more than a felon?
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imprisonment for four years but on bail pending appeal of the conviction, that
the New York statute relating to sentence of imprisonment in a "state prison"
was not applicable since this prisoner would have been serving his sentence in
a federal prison. Therefore, this candidate for office was, in effect, held to be
eligible for office.85 The force of this decision, it seems, is severely limited by
other decisions holding that a sentence in a federal prison is at least as effective
a suspension of rights as is a sentence in a state prison. Why the court did not
base its decision upon the fact that the candidate was, on bail pending appeal
is remarkable, since it has been held that the execution of a judgment of con-
viction, i.e., actual confinement, is the moment when the suspension of civil
rights begins.8 6 In another case where the felons nominated for office were
actually serving sentences in a state prison and a suit was brought to require
their names to be printed on the ballot, it was held that they had no such
right.87 The Court said: "... . it surely cannot be contemplated that a prison
convict can be a nominee when he cannot hold the office if elected."8 8 It would
seem that this is a correct result, yet the possibility of pardon or commutation
of sentence would seem to limit its force, especially where a miscarriage of
justice has occurred.
Holders of professional and other licenses are subject to disciplinary action
and revocation of their license where convicted of crimes. For example, in the
case of attorneys convicted of a felony, the legislature has seen fit to enact
specific provisions. The Judiciary Law provides for disbarment upon conviction
of a felony.89 But upon reversal on appeal, or pardon by the President or the
Governor, the Appellate Division may vacate such order of disbarment. 90 These
provisions have been held to require disbarment as a matter of course immedi-
ately following a judgment of conviction,91 notwithstanding pendency of ap-
peal.92 Even where the conviction has been reversed on appeal, the attorney
must still be reinstated by the Appellate DivisionY3 It should be noted, however,
that the conviction of an attorney for a misdemeanor does not mandate
disbarment as does conviction of a felony.94 Also, it has been held where a
crime was a felony under federal law, but a misdemeanor under New York
law, that the striking of the attorney's name upon presentation of the judg-
85. O'Connor v. Cohen, 173 Misc. 419, 17 N.Y.S.2d 758 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
86. Harmon v. Bower, 78 Kan. 135, 96 Pac. 51, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 502, 16 Ann. Cas.
121 (1908).
87. Matter of Lindgren, 232 N.Y. 59, 133 N.E. 353 (1921).
88. Id. at 65, 133 N.E. at 355.
89. N.Y. judiciary Law § 90(4).
90. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 90(5).
91. E.g., Matter of Steinberg, 12 A.D.2d 331, 211 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1st Dep't 1961).
92. E.g., Matter of Rosenfield, 11 A.D.2d 324, 205 N.Y.S.2d 189 (1st Dep't 1960)
(per curiam); Matter of Scotti, 266 App. Div. 279, 42 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1st Dep't 1943).
93. Matter of Ginsberg, 1 N.Y.2d 144, 134 N.E.2d 193, 151 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1956).
judge Van Voorhis in his dissent pointed out that "he should not be disbarred ... merely
for the reason that he has been accused." Id. at 14, 151 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
94. Matter of Glassman, 19 A.D.2d 146, 241 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1st Dep't 1963) (dictum);
Matter of Hughes, 188 App. Div. 520, 177 N.Y. Supp. 234 (1st Dep't 1919) (dictum).
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ment of conviction was errorP 5 In such a case an attorney is not subject to
summary disbarment.9 6 In a case where an attorney had been convicted of a
federal felony which would not have been a felony under state law, and no
appeal had been taken for the Appellate Division order of disbarment, rendered
upon proof of the judgment of conviction, the Court of Appeals of New York
held that even though no appeal had been taken, the judgment of conviction
was not conclusive on the issue of guilt.9 7 Judge Cardozo, cognizant of the
fact that the attorney involved had been granted two commutations followed
by a full pardon by the President of the United States, pointed out: "[a]
pardon may in some conditions be a warning as significant as a judgment of
reversal that the looms of the law have woven a fabric of injustice.198 There-
fore it seems that even though disbarment follows a judgment of conviction
as a matter of course, this judgment can be attacked collaterally in the dis-
barment proceeding. Certainly the wisdom of the judicial interpretations re-
quiring disbarment as a matter of course is correct as far as it goes; but,
in situations similar to the one confronting Judge Cardozo, it appears that the
ends of justice will not be served by such automatic disbarment, the opportunity
to present facts reducing the gravity of the judgment of conviction must be
preserved.
E. Voting Rights
The United States Constitution recognizes the right of a state to deny its
citizens the franchise.9 9 New York's Constitution provides that no citizen of
the state can be disenfranchised except by the law of the land. 00 In consonance
with this provision, the New York Constitution also provides that "... . [t]he
Legislature enact laws excluding from the right of suffrage persons convicted
of bribery or of any infamous crime."' 0'1 Pursuant to this constitutional
mandate, the legislature has provided that persons convicted of felonies in
New York, or in federal or other state courts (where conviction of a crime would
be a felony if committed in New York), will be denied the right to vote.102
This prohibition applies unless the person convicted has been pardoned or
restored to the rights of citizenship by the governor, or has received a certificate
of good conduct by the Board of Parole pursuant to the Executive Law;' 0 3
or where convicted of a federal felony or a federal crime which would be a
felony if committed in New York unless he is pardoned or restored to the
rights of citizenship by the President; or where convicted of a crime in another
state which would be a felony in New York unless pardoned or restored to the
95. Matter of Donegan, 282 N.Y. 285, 26 N.E.2d 260 (1940).
96. Matter of Lindheim, 195 App. Div. 827, 187 N.Y. Supp. 211 (1st Dep't 1921),
rev'd sub nont. Matter of Kaufman, 245 N.Y. 423, 157 N.E. 730 (1927) (by implication).
97. Matter of Kaufmann, 245 N.Y. 423, 157 N.E. 730 (1927).
98. Id. at 429, 157 N.E. at 732.
99. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2.
100. N.Y. Const. art. 1, § 1.
101. N.Y. Const. art. 2, § 3.
102. N.Y. Election Law § 152. See generally, 18 N.Y. Jur. Elections § 83 (1961).
103. N.Y. Executive Law § 242.
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rights of citizenship by that state. It is to be noted that this curtailment of the
right to vote does not apply to persons convicted of any crime, where sentenced
or committed to a house of refuge or reformatory.1 0 4 Thus a person convicted
of a felony may yet be able to vote where he is committed to any of the last
mentioned institutions. Since a misdemeanant is not specifically denied the
right to vote, he still enjoys that right.10 5 In a case where a judgment of con-
viction of felony was suspended and a fine assessed in lieu of imprisonment,
it was felt that the collection of the fine was the execution of the judgment of
conviction and consequently the right to vote was lost. 00 Compliance with the
rules concerning the requirement of a pardon or certificate of good conduct'
07
was compelled in this case before the right to vote could be restored. In another
case, where a judgment of conviction had not been entered upon a verdict of
guilty, and sentence had been suspended, it was held that the right to vote
was not lost.10 8 The reason given normally for the revocation or suspension of
the right to vote is that to allow the franchise in such cases is not in keeping
with the general feeling that the purity of elections must be preserved. 1°9 The
manner in which this legislative policy has been carried out in New York leaves
much to 'be desired. An arbitrary line separating misdemeanant voters from
felony non-voters does not accurately achieve this purpose. Surely there are
some misdemeanors which import a greater degree of moral turpitude than the
felonies so arbitrarily categorized by the statutes. 110 If the "purity of elections"
is to be preserved, a more reasonable classification of persons subject to suspen-
sion of the right to vote should be formulated.
F. Family Law"'
1. Marriage
The effect of civil death on marital rights has been far from clear in New
York State. The basic question is: Does the marriage end upon the execution
of the judgment of conviction (imprisonment), or must there be some further
court action declaring the marriage at an end?
Where a husband had killed his wife's father and was sentenced for a
period of twenty years to life and the wife brought suit to compel issuance of a
104. N.Y. Pen. Law § 510-a. But see 1933 Ops. Att'y Gen., 1933 Report of Att'y Gen.
571, where Pen. Law § 644 (now § 510-a) was construed not to include the New York
County Penitentiary.
105. 1945 Ops. Att'y Gen., 1945 Report of Att'y Gen. 90.
106. 1950 Ops. Att'y Gen., 1950 Report of Att'y Gen. 115.
107. See Executive Law § 242.
108. People v. Fabian, 192 N.Y. 443, 85 N.E. 672 (1908). See Note, The Meaning of
Conviction, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 1045, 1048 (1930). See also Annot., What Constitutes "Con-
viction" Within Constitutional or Statutory Provision Disfranchising One Convicted of Crime,
36 A.L.R.2d 1238 (1954).
109. 18 Am. Jur. Elections § 80 (1938).
110. For example, contrast Pen. Law § 483(b) (carnal abuse of a child of certain age),
a misdemeanor, with the felony of grand larceny in the joy-ride theft of an automobile.
111. See generally 15 N.Y. Jur. Domestic Relations § 12 (1962).
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marriage license in order to remarry another, the court held that the sentence
ipso facto destroyed the marriage and therefore there was no necessity to
compel issuance of the license.112 This particular problem has plagued the
courts down to the present day. In a later case, a wife whose husband had been
imprisoned for life sought a declaratory judgment that she was free to remarry;
but the court, relying on statutory authority," 3 held that there was no necessity
to grant such a remedy. In Wilder v. Wilder,11 4 a similar case, the court noted
in dismissing the action, ". . . the declaration can add nothing to the actual
legal status of the plaintiff."" 5 But in a very recent case, when faced with
the same factual situation, a court granted a declaratory judgment."16 Whether
or not the wife in asking for declaratory relief made an election to terminate
the marriage was not relevant to this court. The court granted the declaratory
judgment merely to resolve the problem, whether or not there was in actuality
a justiciable issue. New York has also held that a sentence to life imprisonment
in a foreign state is not grounds for annullment of a second marriage contracted
by the "surviving" spouse,117 where it was argued that the second marriage
was void since the first husband was living at the time the second marriage was
contracted. 1 8 In another case where the husband of the first marriage had
been sentenced to life with the consequence of civil death and the wife had
remarried, the second husband tried to defend a separation action brought
by the wife on the grounds of no marriage, relying on a previous Massachusetts
decree which had declared the second marriage void. The New York court,
noting that Massachusetts should have given effect to New York law since the
husband and wife of the second marriage were both New York citizens, held
the defense inapplicable. 1 9 In Matter of Lindewall it was held that insofar as
the civilly dead felon was concerned, a sentence for life automatically destroyed
the marriage relation. 20 Consequently, all property rights established by the
marriage were extinguished, since "... one civilly dead has no rights in the
estate of the innocent spouse."' 2 1
The right to remarry granted to those sentenced for less than life1 22 and
those sentenced to life 123 while on parole greatly improved the status of such
prisoners as was pointed out in the Law Revision Commission Report of
112. Gargan v. Sculy, 82 Misc. 667, 144 N.Y. Supp. 205 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
113. Dom. Re]. Law § 6, now § 58, providing that a pardon will not restore a person
to the rights of a previous marriage.
114. 181 Misc. 1059, 43 N.Y.S.2d 287 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
115. Id. at 1061, 43 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
116. Zizzo v. Zizzo, 41 Misc. 2d 928, 247 N.Y.S.2d 38 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
117. Jones v. Jones, 249 App. Div. 470, 292 N.Y. Supp. 705 (3d Dep't), aff'd mem.,
274 N.Y. 574, 10 N.E.2d 558 (1937).
118. See Dom. Rel. Law § 6 (2).
119. Bond v. Bond, 162 Misc. 449, 295 N.Y. Supp. 24 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
120. 287 N.Y. 347, 39 N.E.2d 907, 139 A.L.R. 1301 (1942).
121. Law Revision Comm., 1952 Report, Recommendations & Studies (1952 Leg. Doc.
No. 65 (Q) at 19).
122. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1946, ch. 260.
123. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1950, ch. 144.
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1953, in that ". . . married parolees, as a class, are unquestionably more law
abiding than single ones."'11 4 But, "... it is questionable whether the creation
of exceptions to the doctrine of civil death has met the real problem."'
2
5 It
would seem that the better rule would be to make imprisonment for life a
grounds for divorce. In so doing, the election of the "injured" spouse to end
her marriage would be made a matter of record which could be relied upon
by all concerned. 126 The grounds for divorce would not be the conviction of
the crime but rather the imprisonment which can be likened to the existing




The Domestic Relations Law of New York129 provides that the consent of
a parent whose civil rights have been suspended or revoked is not necessary
when his or her child is about to be adopted. In keeping with this rationale in
a case where the father had been sentenced for a period less than life but had
been released on parole, and the maternal grandparents were about to adopt
the child, the court held that since parole did not terminate the sentence, the
parent was still under disability. Consequently no consent was necessary. Thus,
under the present statute,13 0 a parolee may sue, may validly contract a marriage,
but is barred from contesting the adoption of his own child. This result is
hardly in keeping with the trend towards liberalization of the effect of civil
death. Can it be said that the right to institute suit is any greater a civil right,
or human right, than that of having custody of one's own child? The harshness
caused by the misapplication of this "medieval fiction"' 3 ' is again made ap-
parent. Inconsistent in result, but equally absurd, was a case holding that a
father's consent to the adoption of his children by a maternal uncle was neces-
sary, even though the father had been convicted of manslaughter in the homicide
of his wife.
132
124. Law Revision Comm., 1953 Report, Recommendations & Studies 511 (1953 Leg.
Doc. No. 65 (M)).
125. 25 St. John's L. Rev. 132, 137 (1950).
126. See Note, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 968, 977 (1937).
127. See Rubin, The Law of Criminal Correction 622 (1963).
128. See generally Foster & Freed, Child Custody, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 423, 434-35 (1964).
129. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 111. Accord, Matter of Miller, 179 N.Y. Supp. 181
(Kings County Ct. 1919). See also Matter of Anonymous, 12 Misc. 2d 1073, 175 N.Y.S.2d
282 (Surr. Ct. 1958), modified, 17 Misc. 2d 691, 187 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Surr. Ct. 1959) (held,
sentence to federal prison for crime which would be a felony in New York suspends civil
rights, therefore, no consent to adoption of children necessary).
130. Matter of O'Daniel, 128 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
131. See Note, Civil Death Statutes-Medieval Fiction in a Modern World, 50 Harv. L.
Rev. 968 (1937) for a good discussion of pre-1946 New York law. See also Note, Civil Death
in California, 26 S. Calif. L. Rev. 425 (1953).
132. Matter of Riggs, 10 Misc. 2d 617, 175 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Surr. Ct. 1958). This deci-
sion is severely undercut, however, due to the fact that the father was not imprisoned in
a "state prison," but was incarcerated at the Elmira Reformatory, thus taking his case
out of the literal application of the statute suspending civil rights.
412
COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER INHERENT RIGHTS OF PRISONERS
13 3
A. General Regulation of the Mail Privilege
Censorship of prisoner's mail is a long established procedure. "Control of
the mail to and from inmates is an essential adjunct of prison administration
and the maintenance of order within the prison."'1 34 Although there is no
specific federal statutory provision concerning censorship in a prison situa-
tion,es5 the constitutionality of censorship regulations has never been seriously
challenged.
136
There is no absolute federal right -to use the mails. 37 The courts have held
that censorship of mail is a matter of administrative discretion and on these
grounds have declined to interfere. 38 In accordance with this rationale, the
petition of an avowed anti-Semite seeking access to the mails for the purpose of
carrying on propagandizing endeavors was properly dismissed.1' Where a
prisoner was refused by prison authorities the right to correspond with a female
acquaintance, it was held that there was no power in a federal court to provide
relief by injunction in such a case.' 40 Where prison authorities have denied
correspondence with sources of technical and legal assistance, it has been held
that this regulation was reasonable.' 41 Although the promotion of inmates' educa-
tion is a primary concern of prison authorities under today's "modern penology,"
where an inmate had begun an extension course in English composition and had
indicated that the reason why he wanted to take the course was so 'he could
prepare himself to write a book exposing the brutality of prison authorities,
it was held that he had abused the mail privilege and was not in any position
to complain of its curtailment. 42 Denials of permission to use the mails for
133. See generally Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law,
110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 985 (1962).
134. McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1964). See generally 72 C.J.S.
Prisons § 18 (c) (1951).
135. See 39 U.S.C.A. § 4057 which allows the opening of mail only in limited situations:
holders of search warrants or employees of the Dead Letter Office. See, e.g., United States
v. Fulcher, 229 F. Supp. 456 (D. Md. 1964) (search warrant necessary to open mail).
See also 39 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1962) (mail is to be treated with confidence). In practice, a
warden normally requires an inmate upon entrance to sign a paper authorizing the open-
ing of mail by prison authorities. If the inmate fails to so authorize, any letters addressed
to him are held for him in his file to be turned over to him upon release, furthermore, he
is unable to send out any mail. Thus, he must sign or he has no mail privilege whatsoever.
136. Coercive though it be, no challenge has been made of which this writer is aware.
See e.g., Adams v. Ellis, 197 F.2d-483, 484 (5th Cir. 1952); Gerrish v. State, 89 F. Supp.
244 (S.D. Maine 1950); United States ex rel. Mitchell v. Thompson, 56 F. Supp. 683
(S.! ..Y . 1944).
137. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Fay, 197 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
138. United States v. Kniess, 251 F.2d 669 (7th Cir. 1958) (per curiam); Reilly v.
Hiatt, 63 F. Supp. 477 (M.D. Pa. 1945).
139. McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1964).
140. Dayton v. Hunter, 176 F.2d 108 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 888 (1949),
rehearing denied, 338 U.S. 945, second petition for rehearing denied, 339 U.S. 972 (1950).
See also Dayton v. McGranery, 201 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1953) where a prisoner was held
properly denied permission to correspond with the daughter of a prison official of another
institution.
141. Miller v. Wilkins, 31 Misc. 2d 700, 220 N.Y.S.2d 671 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
142. Numer v. Miller, 165 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1948).
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the purpose of registering inventions with the Patent Office, 143 carrying on
business interests, 44 and corresponding with the press to present an inmate's
case to the public, 145 have all been upheld by the courts. In an action instituted
under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 14  where an inmate complained of a
warden's refusal to deliver a registered letter containing material necessary to
the preparation of papers in a court action, it was held that the petitioner failed
to state a cause of action .47 As has been said: "Lawful incarceration brings
about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights,
a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system."'
48
In the light of this pronouncement, it is evident that some form of regulation
of mails is necessary. Security is foremost in the minds of prison administrators
and so it should be. The constitutional problem lies in the extent and rational
connection mail regulations have with prison security.
B. Access to the Courts and the Censorship of Mail
Generally it has been held that there can be no limit on the right of a
prisoner to enjoy free access to the courts.1 49 Thus where prison officials re-
fused to notarize and mail papers to the United States Supreme Court it was
held that such regulation was invalid.' 50 Some prison authorities have contended
that the contents of petitions for relief addressed to the courts must be true and
in instances where prisoners had complained of improper treatment, which
the authorities had denied, such petitions have been confiscated. In other in-
stances prison authorities had failed to forward petitions because they felt
that their content was insufficient to present a court with facts upon which it
could afford relief. The United States Supreme Court took a dim view of
such practices, stating: "Whether a petition for [relief] addressed to a federal
court is properly drawn and what allegations it must contain are questions
for that court alone to determine."'' 1 This right of access to the courts has
143. United States ex rel. Wagner v. Ragen, 213 F.2d 294 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 846, petition for rehearing denied, 348 U.S. 884 (1954).
144. Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 829 (1951).
145. Petition of Smigelski, 185 F. Supp. 283 (D.N.J. 1960).
146. 42 U.S.CA. § 1983.
147. Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955).
148. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
149. Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941). Accord, Kirby v. Thomas, 336 F.2d 462
(6th Cir. 1964); Bolden v. Pegelow, 329 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1964); Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177
F. Supp. 361 (1959), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961), noted in 58 Mich. L. Rev. 1233 (1960) and 39
Texas L. Rev. 228 (1960) ; Haines v. Castle, 226 F.2d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 1014 (1956) (dictum); People v. Superior Court, 273 P.2d 936 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1954); Warfield v. Raymond, 195 Md. 711, 71 A.2d 870 (1950); State ex rel. Jacobs v.
Warden of Maryland Penitentiary, 190 Md. 755, 59 A.2d 753 (1948).
150. Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
151. Id. at 549. Accord, Hymes v. Dickson, 232 F. Supp. 796, 797 (N.D. Cal. 1964):
"Inmates should not have to answer for their allegations to the very people against whom
their allegations are directed. To permit such a procedure would be to make a mockery
of the inmates' right to petition to this court." See also People v. Superior Court, 273
P.2d 936 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) where the court held that no matter how false a
petition reads, the prison authorities must send it to the court.
414
COMMENT
been characterized as a question of due process, 152 and, as such, courts should
be wary of any abuse. The interception and delay of communications to
the courts which have affected the timeliness of appeal have been dealt with
by allowing the appeal even though the time had run. 153 A recent case pointed
out that in order to escape such results, federal prison authorities when now
presented with documents by prisoners addressed to courts must inscribe them
with the time of receipt. 54 This procedure is designed to forestall inmates
making any claim of inordinate delay by prison authorities.
This immunity from confiscation or delay of documents has been held
to extend to matters addressed to the United States Attorney General and heads
of departments of his office. 155 In such cases, it is reasoned that such communi-
cations are in the nature of matters addressed to the courts themselves. 156 This
right of access to courts, however, does not extend to the right to correspond
with a specific judge of a court.157 There can be little doubt that these hold-
ings are just, and in keeping with the constitutional guarantees of due process.
C. Right of Access to Materials for the Preparation of Petitions
In a case where a prisoner had elected to represent himself it was held
that he had no absolute right to engage in legal research. 58 This holding is
supported by others which have denied prisoners the right to obtain full sets
of state statutes, 159 and even one certain law book.' 60 The total denial of the
use of law books by prisoners would seem to be a violation of due process,' 61
but the competing interest, it must be remembered, is the orderly administra-
tion of prison affairs. Denial of the right to possess an extensive law library
in a prisoner's cell is proper;' 62 but, such regulations must be administered
judiciously. Complete denial of the right to prepare papers in a prisoner's cell,
the penalty for clandestine activity being confiscation, would probably be
denoted as arbitrary.163 Therefore, administrators should take care to insure
access to legal materials by prisoners in their charge; but prisoners must not
expect special privileges-jail-house lawyers will be frowned upon.
152. Hymes v. Dickson, 232 F. Supp. 796, 797 (N.D. Cal. 1964) (dictum).
153. Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951). Accord, Dodge v.
Bennett, 335 F.2d 657 (1st Cir. 1964); People v. Howard, .166 Cal. App. 2d 638, 334
P.2d 105 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958); People v. Hairston, 10 N.Y.2d 92, 176 N.E.2d 90, 217
N.Y.S.2d 77 (1961).
154. Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139 (1964).
155. Matter of Brabson v. Wilkins, 45 Misc. 2d 286, 256 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
156. Id. at 291, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
157. Spires v. Dowd, 271 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1959).
158. Matter of Chessman v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 2d 1, 279 P.2d 24 (1955). But
see dissenting opinion of Judge Carter where he stated: "If he may transmit 'facts' to
the courts in an attempt to obtain relief he should also be entitled to transmit legal proposi-
tions." Id. at 15, 279 P.2d at 32.
159. Piccoli v. Board of Trustees & Warden of State Prison, 87 F. Supp. 672 (D.N.H.
1949).
160. Grove v. Smyth, 169 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Va. 1958).
161. Hymes v. Dickson, 232 F. Supp. 796 (NJ). Calif. 1964) (by implication).
162. See Bolden v. Pegelow, 329 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1964).
163. See Bailleaux v. Holmes, supra note 149.
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D. Access to Counsel & Privacy of Communications
The privacy of communications between counsel and client suffers somewhat
when the client is a prisoner. Since the security of the prison is foremost in
the minds of prison administrators, a warden may compel a guard to be present
during interviews between attorney and client.164 The right to private consulta-
tion with a client during trial' 65 will not extend to such conversations while the
prisoner is incarcerated. 0 6 Concerning inspection of written correspondence
between prisoners and their attorneys, it has been held that the practice violates
no constitutional right,1 67 thus inspection, and even censorship of mail is
permissible, 168 whereas interception of lawyer-client verbal communications
have been held to be improper. 169 As to derogatory statements concerning
prison life, there is a split of authority.170 The better rule seems to be that it is
an abuse of discretion to deny the right to communicate with attorneys, even
prospective attorneys, even though the content of the prisoner's writing con-
cerning imagined abuses may be totally false or critical of prison authorities.
If this were not the rule, a prisoner who had been truly illegally punished or
denied rights -by arbitrary prison authority would be denied any relief whatso-
ever. This safeguard of allowing free access to counsel is important and must
be preserved.
E. Other Censorship Requirements
The security of a prison must be safeguarded not only by censorship of
the mails, but in many other ways. Thus, where newspapers have been with-
held1 7 1 or censored by clipping out specific articles,172 such action has been held
reasonable in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. The monitoring of con-
versations between prisoners and visitors has also been approved.178 The author-
ity of a warden to select "proper" visitors for prisoners in his charge is also
unquestioned. In a case where both husband and wife had been committed on
164. Gambadoro v. La Valee, 20 Misc. 2d 554, 199 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1960),
aff'd sub nom. Kahn v. La Vallee, 12 A.D.2d 832, 209 N.Y.S.2d 591 (3d Dep't 1961) (by
implication).
165. E.g., Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 926 (1952).
166. But see People v. Del Rio, 25 Misc. 2d 444, 207 N.Y.S.2d 186 (N.Y. County
Ct. 1960) where it was held that a prisoner must be allowed a reasonable place within
which to consult with his attorney outside of the hearing of others.
167. Green v. Maine, 113 F. Supp. 253, 256 (S.D. Maine 1953).
168. United States ex rel. Vraniak v. Randolph, 161 F. Supp. 553 (D. Ill. 1958).
(dictum).
169. Matter of Reuter, 4 A.D.2d 252, 164 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1st Dep't 1957).
170. Compare Matter of Ferguson, 55 Cal.2d 663, 361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr. 793,
cert. denied sub nom. Ferguson v. Heinze, 368 U.S. 864 (1961), with Matter of Gregg,
143 Mont. 523, 392 P.2d 87 (1964) (held, not an abuse of discretion to withhold a letter
by a prisoner to his attorney which was characterized as "grisly" and containing fabrica-
tions. It is interesting to note that the court did not cite a single precedent in support of
its decision).
171. Bloeth v. Cyrta, 39 Misc. 2d 1039, 242 N.Y.S.2d 307 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
172. Morris v. Igoe, 209 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1953).
173. People v. Morgan, 197 Cal. App. 2d 90, 16 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1961), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 965 (1962).
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identical charges and the wife had been released on bail, it was held reasonable
to prevent the wife from consequently visiting her husband who had remained
in custody.T 4 Also, the necessity for lists of approved visitors, excluding known
unsavory persons or recent inmates, is self-explanatory and reflects the concern
for the security of penal institutions.
F. The Right to Competent Medical Care
"Prison physicians owe no less duty to prisoners who must accept their
care, than do private physicians to their patients who are free to choose.'
1 75
A claim by a prisoner that he was refused medical care has thus been held to
state a cause of action 176 under the Federal Civil Rights Act.177 "The obliga-
tion of a State to treat its convicts with decency and humanity is an absolute
one and a federal court will not overlook a breach of that duty."'-78 In cases
where a prisoner requests the attendance of a private physician and he can
afford to pay the fee, prison authorities allow this private attention.
G. The Right to be Free from Racial or Other Segregation
The law concerning racial segregation is presently in a state of flux. Pre-
vious decisions have held that there is no federally protected right to participate
in the transcription of radio programs, prepared for future broadcast, where
Negroes are systematically denied participation, 79 nor will a prisoner be heard
to complain of exclusively Negro cell blocks, formations or dining facilities.-
80
But one federal court recently invoked the spirit of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion when it granted an injunction to petitioners who had complained of indig-
nities suffered by being required to receive haircuts in racially segregated barber
shops.' 8 - It has also been held that where aliens were held pending deportation
proceedings and had complained of close confinement, recreational facilities dif-
ferent from the rest of the prisoners, unhealthy and cramped dining facilities,
and discrimination as to other privileges, that such claims were not proper
subjects of relief.182
It must be recognized that segregation of prisoners, when based upon
actual probabilities of violence or breach of prison discipline, are valid and
174. Akamine v. Murphy, 108 Cal. App. 2d 294, 238 P.2d 606 (1951).
175. Pisacano v. State, 8 A.D.2d 335, 340, 188 N.Y.S.2d 35, 40 (4th Dep't 1999).
176. McCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
177. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. But see Snow v. Roche, 143 F.2d 718 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 788 (1944) (held, allegations of failure to provide medical and dental care were
insufficient to sustain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus where no allegation of illegal
detention was made).
178. Johnson v. Dye. 175 F.2d 250, 256 (3d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Dye v. Johnson, 338 U.S. 864, rehearing denied, 338 U.S. 896 (1949).
179. United States ex rel. Morris v. Radio Station WENR, 209 F.2d 105 (7th Cir.
1953).
180. Nichols v. McGee, 169 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 6
(1959).
181. Bolden v. Pegelow, 329 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1964).
182. United States ex rel. Yaris v. Shaughnessy, 112 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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necessary. But segregation for its own sake is suspect, and reasons for such
treatment should be required of prison officials.
H. Right to be Free from Cruel and Unusual Punishments'8 3
The United States Constitution 18 4 and the New York Constitution"8 ' both
contain provisions prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments. In a recent New
York case it was held that habeas corpus could be utilized to inquire into
".. . further restraint in excess of that permitted by the judgment or consti-
tional guarantees ... ."186 Where a prisoner was placed in solitary confinement,
now euphemistically termed "segregation," for ninety-two days on bread and
water, 18 7 it was held that allegations of such treatment stated a cause of action
under the Federal Civil Rights Act. 8 But where a prisoner complained of a
"conspiracy" against his welfare it was held that federal courts could not
superintend the internal workings of state prisons.189 It seems that allegations
of actual physical mistreatment are the key to these cases.
It has also been held that there is no right not to work while one's case is
pending appeal.'8 0 These decisions and interpretations are based upon rules
of common sense and as long as institutional forces continue to use standards
of reasonable treatment, this area will continue to be of little practical
importance.
I. The Right to Religious Belief and Activity' 91
Of all the problems affecting both prison populations and prison adminis-
trators, the problem concerning religious exercise has enjoyed the most litiga-
tion, publicity and growth and expansion as a legal concept in recent years.
This writer's treatment of the subject is by no means exhaustive, and is pre-
sented only to spotlight the major issues.
New York's Constitution of 1777 provided:
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and wor-
ship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be
allowed, within this State, to all mankind: Provided, That the liberty
of conscience, hereby granted, shall not be so construed as to excuse
acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace
or safety of this State.
10 2
183. See generally Note, 59 Yale L.J. 800 (1950).
184. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
185. N.Y. Const. art. 1, § 5.
186. People ex rel. Brown v. Johnson, 9 N.Y.2d 482, 485, 174 N.E.2d 725, 726,
215 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45 (1961) (testing validity of transfer from state penitentiary to state
hospital for the insane).
187. One hot meal per week was provided during this period.
188. Gordon v. Gannon, 77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Ill. 1948).
189. Curtis v. Jacques, 130 F. Supp. 920 (W.D. Mich. 1954).
190. Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1963),
.petition. for rehearing denied, 375 U.S. 982 (1964).
191. Comment, Prisoners' Religious Freedom, 35 So. Cal. L. Rev. 162, 173 (1962).
See also Comment, Black Muslims in Prison: Muslim Rights and Constitutional Rights,
,62 Colum. L. Rev. 1488 (1962).
192. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, n,348 (1890), citing N.Y. Const. art. 38 (1777).
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As early as 1777, it was realized that a distinction must be drawn between
the right to religious belief and the right to act in pursuance of that religious
belief. This distinction remains valid even today. Conduct remains subject to
regulation for the protection of society. 193 It has been said that the First
Amendment freedoms enjoy a preferred status; 194 but in a prison situation
where the free exercise of religious beliefs could be a threat to discipline, it is
recognized that curbs are both necessary and constitutionally proper. 195 New
York prison authorities are required by law to provide a Bible in each cell.' 96
The law also provides that divine services are to be held, if possible, every Sun-
day, the needs of prison security being kept in mind. The New York Correc-
tion Law' 97 also provides that all persons committed to state prisons are entitled
to the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without
discrimination or preference. This provision does not extend to a prisoner the
right to possession of an Arabic grammar book for use in studying a language
which would help him in the pursuit of his religious belief.
198
The general practice in all state and federal prisons is to hire chaplains,
paying them with governmental funds to minister to the religious needs of its
inmates. These chaplains are normally required to have achieved a certain level
of professional competence before they are considered able to cope with men
in the prison situation.199 In this way the government fulfils its obligation
to the spiritual needs of its prisoners. Where Catholic prisoners in solitary con-
finement were denied the right to attend Mass but the prison chaplain adminis-
tered the sacraments to these prisoners individually on Sundays and Holy days,
it was held that there was no denial of the exercise of religion.2 00
With the growth of the Black Muslim sect, special problems have presented
themselves to both state and federal penal authorities. In an attempt to insure
the security of their prisons, wardens and commissioners of correction have
somewhat sacrificed the religious rights of the followers of Elijah Muhammed,
as the Muslims have been regarded as a major threat to prison discipline due to
their adherence to inflammatory doctrines, in particular, the doctrine of Black
Supremacy. The courts have been caught in the middle of this dilemma, balanc-
ing on one side the Muslim's constitutional right to freedom of religious belief,
and on the other, the administrator's concern for prison security. The judiciary
has recognized that prison affairs are normally best left to prison authorities,
and except in extreme cases, courts should not interfere with prison rules, regu-
193. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
194. E.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945) (speech & assembly).
195. Matter of Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753, cert. denied,
368 U.S. 864 (1961). Accord, Cooke v. Tramburg, 43 NJ. 514, 205 A.2d 889 (1964). See
also 75 Harv. L. Rev. 837 (1962).
196. N.Y. Corr. Law § 500-e. Note there is no stipulation as to which Bible.
197. N.Y. Corr. Law § 610.
198. Wright v. Wilkins, 26 Misc. 2d 1090, 210 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Ct. 1961).
199. See, e.g., 7 N.Y. Codes, Rules & Regulations §§ 59.1-59.9 (1962).
200. McBride v. McCorkle, 44 NJ. Super. 468, 130 A.2d 881 (App. Div. 1957).
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lations or discipline.20 ' A fuller comprehension of this problem can be had
by tracing the experience of the federal courts during the past few years.
In Pierce v. La Vallee)2 0 2 although the question was actually moot, it was
said that the denial by the state of possession of the Muslim's holy book, the
Koran (denoted Quer'an by Black Muslims), would be a direct violation of
the Civil Rights Act.203 In another case brought under the Civil Rights Act
where prisoners complained that they had been deprived of the right to com-
municate with religious advisors, had been forbidden the wearing of religious
medals, and letters of complaint had been suppressed, a hearing of these charges
was required.20 4 The hearing was held as directed but there was no consequent
redress of their grievances. The same parties sued again. On appeal of this
second suit, the prison authorities finally acceded to petitioners' demands. The
appeal was dismissed on stipulation-by the parties when it was assured the
prisoners that the Koran (Quer'an) and other prayer books would be made
available to them; correspondence with ministers of their faith would be allowed,
within reasonable limitations; local ministers would be allowed to address them;
the wearing of religious medals would be authorized; and groupings of inmates
for purposes of prayer, discussion and study would be allowed.2 05 The court,
mindful of the fact that assurances made are not always kept, dismissed the
action, without prejudice to the right of the parties to reinstitute the proceed-
ings in the event the prison authorities failed to keep their word.2 00 Thus the
Black Muslims of Lorton Reformatory ostensibly won the day.
A prisoner, exercising his privilege as granted in the stipulation disposing
of the previous case discussed, had been transferred from Lorton and placed in
solitary confinement for a period of two years, as the authorities regarded his
speech as inflammatory. It was held that such punishment was improper and
that he must be returned to the general prison population 0 7 This case has
been noted as a landmark in the expansion of the law in the area of cruel and
unusual punishment 2 08 but it would seem that its First Amendment overtones
are more important. A later case holding that agitation was a proper cause
for discipline appears to cast some doubt on the force of this argument.200 But,
agitation when clothed in religious garb is no less agitation, especially where
men of violence abound, as they do in a prison population. Free speech and
201. Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 932
(1964).
202. 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961).
203. 28 U.S.C. § 1343; 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See also Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546
(1964) (per curiam) (denial of right to purchase religious publications state a cause of
action under Civil Rights Act.)
204. Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961).
205. Sewel v. Pegelow, 304 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1962). See also Roberts v. Pegelow,
313 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963).
206. Sewell v. Pegelow, supra note 205.
207. Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (DD.C. 1962).
208. Note, 8 Vill. L. Rev. 379, 384 (1963).
209. Pierce v. La Vallee, 212 F. Supp. 865 (N.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd mein., 319 F.2d
844 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 918 (1964).
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religious acts as opposed to religious belief must be curbed where there is such
a danger of violence.
The right to possess a prayer -book and religious medals, and the right to
visits by ministers having been won, the Black Muslims then sought to compel
prison authorities to recognize dietary restrictions, knowing that the dietary
restrictions of Catholics and Jews were fully acknowledged.
Fasting is required during daylight hours during the Moslem month of
Ramadan. Daylight hours are ascertained in a most unusual way. A Moslem
may eat during this month only when upon inspection of a white and a black
thread held in front of him he can tell no difference in color. Only then have
the hours of darkness commenced. In attempting to defer to the wishes of the
Black Muslim inmates, officials relied on Naval Observatory time rather than
upon the traditional test as outlined above. The court, when petitioned to com-
pel implementation of the traditional test held that there was no justiciable
issue; that the prisoners were seeking a special privilege. Judge Sobeloff, in a
vigorous dissent, observed:
To those who are not versed in their ritualistic requirements the
distinction [between the traditional test and the time as delineated
by the Naval Observatory] may appear foolish; but the same may
be said of the fasts and feasts and the many other religious practices
of more traditional denominations.210
The time difference may be critical to Moslems and should not be lightly dis-
missed, any more than Catholics should be served nothing but meat every
Friday.
The right to purchase inflammatory religious newspapers is not federally
protected,2 11 nor should it be where insubordination and breaches of discipline
are the result. The federal courts have found that the periodicals, Mukammed
Speaks and Salaam, are proscribed for that reason.2 12
A recent federal case utilized the test of clear and present danger where
the competing interests were religious freedom and prison discipline. In this
case,213 the director of a penal institution had curtailed Black Muslim activities
because he felt that riots would ensue. The court held that inmates must be
allowed the right to practice where there was no clear and present danger of
disturbance. The court warned, however:
Lest there be no misunderstanding, the practice of this right
(religious freedom) in a penal institution is not absolute--it is sub-
210. Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487, 492 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
932 (1964).
211. Desmond v. Blackwell, 235 F. Supp. 246 (M.D. Pa. 1964).
212. See Desmond v. Blackwell, supra note 211. But see Coleman v. District of
Columbia Commissioners, 234 F. Supp. 408 (E.D. Va. 1964) (by implication) (had sued
to require officials to allow purchase of Muhhammed Speaks but question was moot since
prisoner was allowed them after suit instituted). See also Blazic v. Fay, 21 A.D.2d 817,
251 N.Y.S.2d 494 (2d Dep't 1964) (Memorandum decision) (religious material must be
in violation of reasonable rules and regulations concerning prison discipline in order to be
subject to confiscation).
213. Banks v. Havener, 234 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Va. 1964).
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ject to rules and regulations necessary to the safety of the prisoners
and the orderly functioning of the institution.214
In New York, subsequent to the Court of Appeals decision Brown v. McGin-
his215 (prisoner was held to have a right to a hearing to determine the scope
of his right to religious practice while in prison), and pursuant to the Court's
mandate, the Department of Correction promulgated rules and regulations con-
cerning religious services and ministrations in state institutions. 216 These rules
were geared primarily to the "established" religions, namely Christianity and
Judaism. Qualifications for chaplaincy of "approved denominations" were set
forth, the Commissioner of Correction declaring that Islam consists of three
specified sects, of which the followers of Elijah Muhammed, the Black Muslims,
are not a part.217 This failure to recognize the Black Muslims as a valid religious
sect was later held to be a forbidden prior restraint of religious exercise. 218 The
opportunity afforded the state to propose workable rules and regulations in
this sensitive area219 was to no avail. Although other courts had at least recog-
nized the authenticity of Black Muslimism as a religious sect,2 2 0 the Com-
missioner had declined to so find. Thus his regulations were found to be in-
adequate. The court noted:
It is apparent that the effect of the regulations adopted ... is to
prevent members of the Muslim religion from obtaining spiritual ad-
vice and ministration from ministers of their own faith and choos-
ing and conducting the other religious exercises described in their
petitions.22
1
The court directed that the Commissioner revise his rules, keeping in mind
the spirit of the Federal and State Constitutions and section 610 of the Penal
Law which preserves the religious freedom of prisoners. In granting the peti-
tioners' request for equal treatment with other religious sects, the court recog-
nized the need for safeguarding against breaches of prison discipline in the
guise of religious exercise. The reputed philosophy of Black Muslimism, Black
Supremacy, could be a source of disruption to prison life. The federal courts
had recognized this problem. A balance between these two elements must be
kept stable.
The particular characteristics of the Muslims obviously require that
whatever rights may be granted because of the religious content of
their practices must be carefully circumscribed by rules and regula-
tions which will permit the authorities to maintain discipline in the
prison. 22
214. Id. at 31.
215. 10 N.Y.2d 531, 180 N.E.2d 791, 225 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1962).
216. 7 N.Y. Codes, Rules and Regulations §§ 59.1-59.9 (1962).
217. 7 N.Y. Codes, Rules and Regulations § 59.9 (1962).
218. Bryant v. Wilkins, 45 Misc. 2d 923, 258 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
219. Cf. Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964).
220. E.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, supra note 219.
221. Bryant v. Wilkins, 45 Misc. 2d 923, 929, 258 N.Y.S.2d 455, 461 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
222. Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964).
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The recognition of the Black Muslims as a valid religious sect is only a
preliminary question. Now that the findings have been made conclusive that
they are as such, the next issue will be the permissible extent of the exercise
of their beliefs in the prison situation. Possession of their Bible, the particular
translation of the Koran which they require, and the authority to purchase
other religious objects would seem to be totally permissible. 
5 Under the deci-
sion in Bryant v. Wilkins2m4 it would seem that the right to correspond, receive
instruction, visitations and to attend congregational services held by a minister
of their faith are also within the protection of the law. Where feasible, obser-
vance of dietary laws of Near Eastern and other religions should also be
allowed.s 5 When the Commissioner's new regulations are ready for publication,
it is hoped that all these areas will be satisfactorily covered.
CONCLUSION
With the total revision and re-codification of New York's Penal Law, it
might have been expected that the doctrine of civil death would have been
scrapped. But it seems that this sadly misused doctrine will stay with us. It
will appear as before, verbatim, in the Civil Rights Law.226 Disability, the
penalty of civil death, is no deterrent,2 27 and at best its application is un-
predictable, therefore its continuance seems to serve no useful purpose. It has
never helped the family of an inmate, but has created still more problems for
them. The Model Penal Code solution is simple: no disability attaches upon
imprisonment except for those rights necessarily incident to execution, specifi-
cally denied by constitution or statute, or order of court. 28 In this way, the
difficulties inherent in the application of the sweeping common law doctrine
are avoided.
A prisoner should be allowed to pursue any suit, in person, by attorney or
committee. Causes of action should not be allowed to expire for the mere
reason that the party is under disability. The franchise of prisoners institu-
223. See Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam).
224. Bryant v. Wilkins, 45 Misc. 2d 923, 258 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
225. It is to be noted that the Commissioners allow Roman Catholic and Orthodox
Jewish inmates the observance of their dietary restrictions. Why should it be any different
for Muslims, if it is conceded that this sect is a religion?
226. See N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 79, effective September 1, 1967.
227. See Rubin, The Law of Criminal Correction 620 (1963).
228. Model Penal Code § 306.1 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962):
(1) No person shall suffer any legal disqualification or disability because of his
conviction of a crime or his sentence on such conviction, unless the disqualification
or disability involves the deprivation of a right or privilege which is:
(a) necessarily incident to execution of the sentence of the Court; or
(b) provided by the Constitution or the Code; or
(c) provided by a statute other than the Code, when the conviction is of a
crime defined by such statute; or
(d) provided by the judgment, order or regulation of a court, agency or
official exercising a jurisdiction conferred by law, or by the statute defining such
jurisdiction, when the commission of the crime or the conviction or the sentence
is reasonably related to the competency of the individual to exercise the right or
privilege of which he is deprived.
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tionalized should depend on a more rational ground than either the classifica-
tion of their crime as felony or misdemeanor, or their incarceration in state
rather than county prison. A better standard would exclude from the franchise
all persons convicted of a crime rather than the incongruous results under the
present state of the law. Life imprisonment should be made a grounds for
divorce. This would seem a more workable solution to the problem where a
spouse desires to remarry and is uncertain of his or her status.
Censorship, where necessary, should continue; but never at the expense
of a prisoner's right of access to his attorney or the courts. The first amend-
ment freedoms extended to those under state control by the fourteenth amend-
ment must also be protected. Prison officials cannot be allowed to employ "re-
quirements of prison discipline and security" to abridge these preferred rights
where there is no showing of clear and present danger.
It appears, that if the prisoner is to be rehabilitated, he must be allowed
to maintain his dignity. The denial of civil rights or abridgment of constitu-
tional guarantees can only serve to defeat honest attempts at rehabilitation
made by prison administrators.
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